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





Protecting Authors and Artists by Closing the Streaming Loophole

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Copyright protects the property rights of authors and artists through both civil and criminal remedies for infringement. While the civil remedies are commonplace, the sections of the Copyright Act that specify which forms of infringement qualify as criminal offenses are less familiar.[1] Unfortunately for authors and artists, the remedies for criminal infringement have not been updated to reflect the realities of how copyrighted works are frequently misappropriated these days. Streaming has become more popular than ever, yet the law treats bad actors who traffic in illicit streams much more kindly than those who traffic in illicit downloads. This results in a loophole that emboldens bad actors and makes it harder for authors and artists to protect their property rights.

Authors and artists deserve better. It shouldn't matter whether the works are illegally streamed to users or offered for download. From the perspective of a creator whose property rights are being ripped off, the result is exactly the same—the works are supplied to the public without the creator's permission. Congress has a long history of modernizing copyright law to account for ever-changing technologies. Now that the internet has advanced to where streaming is a dominant method of illicitly disseminating copyrighted works, the time has come to close the streaming loophole and to harmonize the remedies for criminal copyright infringement.

From the Creator's Perspective, Downloading and Streaming Are the Same

Here's how the loophole works: Large-scale infringers can be convicted of criminal infringement, but whether that crime is a felony or a misdemeanor depends on whether the defendant offers downloads or streams. Someone who wrongfully uploads works to the internet for others to *download* can be charged with either a misdemeanor or a felony.[2] But someone who *streams* those same works over the internet can only be charged with a misdemeanor.[3] This disparity in potential remedies creates a loophole that allows many large-scale infringers to escape criminal prosecution, as federal prosecutors are generally loath to expend their limited resources prosecuting misdemeanors.[4]

The difference between downloading and streaming is relatively straightforward. If John downloads an infringing copyrighted work from Dave's computer, Dave is an uploader and John is a downloader. Dave violates the copyright owner's public distribution right, since he supplied John with the work,[5] while John violates the copyright owner's reproduction right, since he made a copy.[6] Streaming, on the other hand, implicates the copyright owner's public performance right.[7] As with downloading, streaming involves transmitting the work over the internet to members of the public. The difference, however, is that streamed works can be watched or listened to while they're being sent, whereas downloads have to be fully transmitted before the user can enjoy them.[8]

In copyright terminology, if John downloads a song using iTunes, Apple has publicly *distributed* the work. However, if John uses Spotify to listen to that same song, Spotify has publicly *performed* the work. But in both scenarios, the work has been transmitted to a member of the public, and this is why it makes little sense to treat the two differently. (Of course, unlike the criminals we're talking about, Apple and Spotify pay for licenses to offer downloads or streams.) From the perspective of an author or artist trying to protect her property rights, the question of whether the work is perceived simultaneously with the transmission or at a later time is of little relevance. The fact that her work is being provided to the public without her consent is what matters.

Whether the misappropriated works are ultimately streamed in real-time or downloaded for later use, the bad actor does essentially the same thing in offering the illicit works so that members of the public can receive them. And yet copyright law favors illegal streamers by making the potential remedies for their crimes less severe than for those who enable illicit downloading. When it comes to protecting the property rights of artists and authors, given the similarities in providing misappropriated works for others to either download or stream, it doesn't make sense to treat the two differently.

Streaming has become more popular than ever, yet the law treats bad actors who traffic in illicit streams much more kindly than those who traffic in illicit downloads.

Evolving Remedies for Criminal Infringement

Over the years, copyright law has frequently responded to changes in technology. In fact, it was the development of the printing press that gave rise to the first copyright statute.[9] As new methods of reproducing and disseminating works arise, Congress regularly updates copyright law to take into account these new technologies. While the printing press was certainly groundbreaking in its time, perhaps no technology has been more revolutionary with respect to the implications for authors and artists than the internet. It has never been easier to send copyrighted works worldwide, and Congress has been struggling to keep up.[10]

Criminal remedies for copyright infringement are nothing new. In fact, Congress first created them back in 1897, when it defined certain "willful and for profit" public performances to be a crime.[11] With its omnibus revision of the Copyright Act in 1909, Congress extended criminal remedies to infringements of the other exclusive rights.[12] For the many decades that followed, the potential remedies were the same for violations of the various rights. The advent of new analog recording technologies in the early 1970s led to an eruption of infringement, particularly of the reproduction and public distribution rights. Congress responded with new remedies for violations of these two rights.[13]

Beginning in the early 1990s, advances in home computing and the internet led to another outburst of copyright infringement, and Congress again responded by adjusting the potential criminal remedies.[14] But back then, internet access speeds were much slower, and uploading and downloading were the predominant ways of disseminating copyrighted works over the internet. As a result, Congress's response focused on creators' reproduction and public distribution rights rather than on their public performance rights. In fact, the last time Congress meaningfully updated the criminal laws for online copyright infringement was in 1997, when it redefined what it means to infringe for "financial gain."[15] Congress noted at the time that as technology evolves, "more piracy will ensue," and that it "must respond appropriately with additional penalties to dissuade such conduct."[16]

In recent years, improvements in connection speeds have ushered in a new era of streaming.[17] According to data from Sandvine,[18] real-time audio and video entertainment accounted for only 29.5% of peak period internet traffic in 2009. Over the next few years, that number climbed significantly, accounting for 67.5% of such traffic in 2014. Figure 1 below shows how the popularity of streaming has grown dramatically since 2009.

Nowadays, many people prefer to stream copyrighted works over the internet on-demand rather than download them or buy physical copies. Legal streaming services such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon, Spotify, and Pandora are used by millions to stream content in real-time with just the click of the mouse. Unfortunately, illegal streaming sites have become popular as well, and cyberlockers abound where users can find illicit versions of just about any content.[19] Despite the ensuing piracy enabled by new streaming technologies and the repeated calls to harmonize the criminal remedies for illicit streaming,[20] Congress has not responded with new penalties to dissuade such infringing conduct.

Figure 1: Entertainment Streaming as Percentage of Peak Period Internet Traffic



Source: Sandvine

High Thresholds for Criminal Remedies

Much of the fear around harmonizing the criminal remedies for downloading and streaming centers on the idea that ordinary people will be thrown in jail for doing everyday acts, like uploading or embedding YouTube videos.[21] The truth is that this concern is severely overblown, and such commonplace activities can't be prosecuted because they don't meet the high thresholds necessary to secure criminal convictions.[22] In a civil copyright case, the copyright owner does not have to prove that the defendant *intended* to infringe.[23] But in a criminal case, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "willfully" infringed.[24] Several courts have interpreted this to mean that the prosecutor must prove that the defendant intentionally violated a known legal duty.[25]

Furthermore, in order to secure a criminal conviction for copyright infringement, the government must also prove that there was a significant level of infringement. For example, a felony conviction for infringement of the reproduction or public distribution right requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant infringed at least ten copies of one or more copyrighted works having a retail value of more than $2,500 during a 180-day period.[26] Applying these same thresholds to infringement of the public performance right via streaming, it's easy to see why the typical YouTuber would not be prosecuted. Not only would the government have to prove that the defendant "willfully" infringed, the government would also have to show that infringement included numerous works with significant retail value.

Harmonizing the criminal remedies for bad actors who enable illicit streams would protect authors and artists from *willful* and *large-scale* infringements of their public performance rights. The point is to give federal prosecutors better tools to go after the most egregious criminals, not to punish ordinary people. The fact that criminal streamers can only be charged with a misdemeanor disincentivizes the government from bringing such charges in the first place.[27] In the *Megaupload* case, for example, the government alleged several felonies for violations of the victims' reproduction and public distribution rights, but it didn't bother to bring misdemeanor charges against the defendants for the streaming they allegedly enabled.[28]

When it comes to protecting the property rights of artists and authors, it doesn't make sense to treat streams and downloads differently.

When you combine the high legal thresholds for obtaining criminal convictions with the fact that federal prosecutors are generally disinclined to spend their time on misdemeanors, the reality is that very few people are ever charged with criminally violating the public performance rights of authors and artists. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has limited resources, and it brings very few criminal copyright cases each year. The most recent data shows that the DOJ brought only 46 cases against 70 defendants in 2011 and 40 cases against 59 defendants in 2012 for criminal copyright infringement.[29] The DOJ uses the little assets it has to go after only the most flagrant infringers, and there is no reason to think that harmonizing criminal remedies for those who enable streaming will change this.

Conclusion

It is past time to update the Copyright Act for the modern streaming world by harmonizing the criminal remedies for those who enable large-scale streaming with those who enable large-scale downloading. Long gone are the days of dial-up internet and hours-long download times. Millions of people have shifted to on-demand streaming services to obtain copyrighted works in real-time, and illicit streaming sites that traffic in misappropriated copyrighted works imperil not only the property rights of authors and artists, but also the viability of legitimate businesses offering licensed streaming content.

Congress should not favor the bad actors who capitalize on these increasingly-used technologies for illicitly disseminating copyrighted works to the public. Closing the streaming loophole is an important step in protecting the authors and artists who create the very works that make these streaming technologies worthwhile. We should give our federal prosecutors the tools they need to bring down the most egregious bad actors.

ENDNOTES

1 *See* 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 506(a)(1)(A)-(C) (West 2015) (criminalizing infringement, such as when done "willfully" and "for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain").

2 *See* 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)(1)(A) (West 2015); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2319(b)(1)-(2), 3571(b)(3), 3559(a)(3) (West 2015) (establishing misdemeanor and felony penalties for certain reproductions and distributions, including a fine up to $250,000 and imprisonment up to five years; for subsequent convictions, imprisonment can be up to ten years).

3 *See* 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)(1)(A) (West 2015); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2319(b)(3), 3571(b)(5), 3559(a)(6) (West 2015) (establishing misdemeanor penalties for certain public performances, including a fine up to $100,000 and imprisonment up to one year; there are no increased penalties for subsequent convictions).

4 *See, e.g.,* Brian T. Yeh, Congressional Research Service, Illegal Internet Streaming of Copyrighted Content: Legislation in the 112th Congress, Summary (Aug. 29, 2011), http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/R41975_110829.pdf ("Yet under the current law, many illegal streaming websites have evaded prosecution due largely to a disparity regarding the criminal penalties available for those who willfully infringe copyrights by means of reproduction and distribution (a felony offense in certain circumstances) and those who infringe copyrights by means of public performance (a misdemeanor)."); The Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy, 45 (July 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf ("The lack of potential felony penalties for criminal acts of streaming disincentivizes prosecution and undermines deterrence.").

5 *See* 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(3) (West 2015) (granting a copyright owner the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending"); *see also* New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001) ("LEXIS/NEXIS, by selling copies of the Articles through the NEXIS Database, 'distribute copies' of the Articles 'to the public by sale,' § 106(3)"); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 173 (D. Mass. 2008) ("An electronic file transfer is plainly within the sort of transaction that § 106(3) was intended to reach.").

6 *See* 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1) (West 2015) (granting a copyright owner the exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords"); *see also* A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Napster users who download files containing copyrighted music violate plaintiffs' reproduction rights."); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Courts have consistently held that the unauthorized duplication of digital music files over the Internet infringes a copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce.").

7 *See* 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(4) (West 2015) (granting a copyright owner the exclusive right, "in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly").

8 *See, e.g.,* United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Downloading is the transmission of a digital file over the internet from a server computer, which hosts the file, to a client computer, which receives a copy of the file during the download. . . . Streaming, by contrast, allows the real-time (or near real-time) playing of the song and does not result in the creation of a permanent audio file on the client computer."); Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 40 (D. Mass. 2013) ("Aereo's technology allows users to stream but not download programming. As such, Aereo is more aptly described as 'performing' than 'distributing' copyrighted works.").

9 *See, e.g.,* Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984) ("From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a

new form of copying equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary."); Brian A. Carlson, *Balancing the Digital Scales of Copyright Law*, 50 SMU L. Rev. 825, 828 (1997) ("Evolutionary and revolutionary technological innovations have influenced the main legislative acts and amendments of copyright law throughout history.").

10 *See, e.g.,* Liz Gee, *Ten Strikes and You're A Felon? The Commercial Felony Streaming Act and the Evolution of Modern Copyright Norms in the Digital Era*, 14 T.M. Cooley J. Prac. & Clinical L. 227 (2013) ("Since the proliferation of the Internet; the emergence and viability of social media; and the explosion of websites featuring user-generated content, music, movies, and other media-based content, federal copyright laws have struggled to adapt to these new and emerging technologies.").

11 *See* Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82 ("Any person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical composition for which a copyright has been obtained, without the consent of the proprietor of said dramatic or musical composition, or his heirs or assigns, shall be liable for damages therefor . . . . If the unlawful performance and representation be willful and for profit, such person or persons shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction be imprisoned for a period not exceeding one year.").

12 *See* Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 28, 35 Stat.1075, 1082 ("Any person who willfully and for profit shall infringe any copyright secured by this Act, or who shall knowingly and willfully aid or abet such infringement, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not exceeding one year or by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars) or both, in the discretion of the court . . . ."); *see also* United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D. Mass. 1994) ("In 1909, the Copyright Act was revised to extend misdemeanor criminal sanctions to infringement of all copyrighted material with the exception of sound recordings.").

13 *See, e.g.,* Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91.

14 *See, e.g.,* Copyright Felony Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233; No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-107, 111 Stat. 2678; Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860; Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention (ART) Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218; Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property (PRO IP) Act of 2008, Pub. L. No 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256; *see also* Michael Coblenz, *Intellectual Property Crimes*, 9 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 235, 239 (1999) ("[C]hanges to the criminal laws were made in response to technological changes that have created serious problems for protecting IP rights.").

15 *See* No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-107, 111 Stat. 2678, 2678 (defining "financial gain" to include "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.").

16 H.R. Rep. No. 105-339, at 4, (1997), https://www.congress.gov/105/crpt/hrpt339/CRPT-105hrpt339.pdf.

17 *See, e.g.,* Nielsen Entertainment & Billboard's 2014 Mid-Year Music Industry Report, 1 (2014), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/public%20factsheets/Soundscan/nielsen-music-2014-mid-year-us-release.pdf ("On-Demand streaming was up 42 percent over last year, with on-demand audio up 50.1 percent and on-demand video up 35.2 percent."); Joshua P. Friedlander, News and Notes on 2014 Mid-Year RIAA Shipment and Revenue Statistics, 1 (2014), http://riaa.com/media/1806D32F-B3DD-19D3-70A4-4C31C0217836.pdf ("Streaming music services grew 28% in the first half of 2014 to $859 million, versus $673 million for 1H 2013.").

18 *See* Sandvine, Global Internet Phenomena Report, https://www.sandvine.com/trends/global-internet-phenomena/ (last accessed Oct. 5, 2015).

19 *See, e.g.,* NetNames, Behind the Cyberlocker Door: A Report on How Shadowy Cyberlocker Businesses Use Credit Card Companies to Make Millions, 1 (2014), http://www2.itif.org/2014-netnames-profitability.pdf ("Analysis of a sampling of the files on . . . thirty cyberlocker sites found that the vast majority of files were clearly infringing. At least . . . 83.7 percent of files on streaming cyberlockers infringed copyright.").

20 *See* U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, Administration's White Paper on Intellectual Property Enforcement Legislative Recommendations, 10 (March 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ip_white_paper.pdf ("The Administration recommends that Congress clarify that infringement by streaming, or by means of other similar new technology, is a felony in appropriate circumstances."); Statement of David Bitkower, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet, U.S. House of Representatives, 7 (July 24, 2014), http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/c2cf069f-5e3d-4449-8614-c05b183fd910/bitkower-doj-remedies-testimony.pdf ("To deter pirate streaming websites from illegally profiting from others' efforts and creativity, the Administration recommends that Congress amend the law to create a felony penalty for unauthorized Internet streaming. Specifically, we recommend the creation of legislation to establish a felony charge for infringement through unauthorized public performances conducted for commercial advantage or private financial gain."); Statement of Maria A. Pallante, Acting Register of Copyrights, Before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 11 (June 1, 2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Pallante0612011.pdf ("As a matter of policy, the public performance right should enjoy the same measure of protection from criminals as the reproduction and distribution rights; prosecutors should have the option of seeking felony penalties for such activity, when appropriate.").

21 *See, e.g.,* Ernesto, *Free Justin Bieber! (Why Streaming Shouldn't Be A Felony)*, TorrentFreak (Oct. 19, 2011), https://torrentfreak.com/free-justin-bieber-111019/ ("In short, everyone who shares a video which contains copyrighted material, a cover of a popular song for example, will face a maximum of 5 years in jail if the 'felony streaming' bill becomes law. Justin Bieber included.").

22 *See, e.g.,* Terry Hart, *Fear of Felony Streaming Bill Overblown*, Copyhype (June 7, 2011), http://www.copyhype.com/2011/06/fears-of-felony-streaming-bill-overblown/ ("No one need worry about facing jail time for sharing videos online should S.978 pass."); Terry Hart, *Commercial Felony Streaming Act FUD*, Copyhype (July 6, 2011), http://www.copyhype.com/2011/07/commercial-felony-streaming-act-fud/ ("To sum up, Bill S.978 can't be used to prosecute the uses that many fear it applies to. It doesn't change what conduct is legal and what conduct is illegal. It is designed to apply only to outright pirates who profit off the streaming of unauthorized copyrighted works, and the language reflects this design.").

23 *See, e.g.,* Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) ("Intention to infringe is not essential under the act."); Cooley v. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., 31 F. Supp. 3d 599, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("An intent to infringe is not required, for copyright is a strict liability statute.").

24 *See, e.g.,* 17 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)(1) (West 2015) ("Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18 . . . ."); *id.* at § 506(a)(2) ("[E]vidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement of a copyright.").

25 *See, e.g.,* United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (D. Neb. 1991) ("[U]nder 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) 'willfully' means that in order to be criminal the infringement must have been a 'voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.'"); United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2013) ("We now explicitly hold that 'willfully' as used in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) connotes a 'voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.'"); 5-15 Nimmer on

Copyright § 15.01[A][2] (Lexis 2015) ("[T]he better view construes the 'willfulness' required for criminal copyright infringement as a 'voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.'").

26 *See* 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319(b)(1) (West 2015) ("Any person who commits an offense under section 506(a)(1)(A) of title 17 . . . shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $2,500[.]").

27 *See, e.g.,* Mary Jane Saunders, *Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Copyright Felony Act*, 71 Denv. U. L. Rev. 671, 678 (1994) ("Unfortunately, even when the piracy was large scale, prosecutions under the Copyright Act were not appealing, because the penalties for most software piracy remained at the misdemeanor level."); Statement of Maria A. Pallante, Acting Register of Copyrights, Before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 10 (June 1, 2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Pallante0612011.pdf ("[E]xisting law provides a disincentive for prosecutors to take action under this provision because it is not possible to charge a felony for criminal infringement of the public performance right – only a misdemeanor.").

28 *See* United States v. Kim Dotcom, Case No. 1:12CR3, Superseding Indictment, 72-76 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-edva/legacy/2013/12/20/Certified%20Mega%20Superseding%20Indictment%20%282-16-2012%29.pdf.

29 *See* U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, FY 2011 Performance and Accountability Report, D-3 (Nov. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/11/15/par2011.pdf; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, FY 2012 Performance and Accountability Report, D-3 (Nov. 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2012/11/26/par2012.pdf.

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CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

The Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) at George Mason University School of Law is dedicated to the scholarly analysis of intellectual property rights and the technological, commercial, and creative innovation they facilitate. CPIP explores how strong property rights in innovation and creativity can foster successful and flourishing individual lives and national economies.

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